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Cultural Impact of the Trump Administration on Europe (so far)

     EurDC is not a think tank and does not align politically with any ideology. This article does not evaluate the legality or technical merits of recent geopolitical developments. I'm not an expert on geopolitics nor pretend to be (though I hold a bachelor's degree in political science) and b) it doesn't seem to matter; realism is dominating, but the silver lining is that the pendulum may swing so far that it swings back the other way quickly and liberalism regains its foothold in international political frameworks (I'm sure John Mearsheimer is wetting himself with glee right now). Asking European NATO partners to increase their defense spending is one thing, which wouldn't warrant a commentary from me on a cultural organization's blog, but the Trump Administration has inserted itself in European affairs so much that it brought what it means to have a European identity and a relationship with the United States that it's morphed into something more than a sole political conversation.

    It all began with JD Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference. He cited suppression of free speech as a primary example of how Europe has abandoned its shared values between it and the United States. Suddenly, many right-wing voices in Europe found backing from across the Pond. Prominent online figures in Donald Trump's ear, such as the late Charlie Kirk and Elon Musk, took to social media to amplify right-leaning British voices to an American audience, which gave them the opportunity to widely publicize incidents regarding migrants and those with foreign backgrounds in the UK committing violent crimes, as well as the arrests of citizens for speech and social media posts. Due to British and American close historical ties and shared language, American conservatives have been mostly concerned with UK right-leaning politics, particularly the imprisonments of Tommy Robinson, leader of Unite the Kingdom rallies, at one of which Musk gave a speech, and Lucy Connolly, though this acted as a springboard for the American public's interest in broader European right-leaning politics as a whole.

    Starting during the Biden Presidency, the Ukraine War was a hot-button issue going into Donald Trump's second term. Ukraine’s reconstruction has emerged as a major arena for transatlantic cooperation and private investment, with American firms and institutions playing central roles across key sectors. Beyond emergency security aid, Washington and Kyiv have jointly established a reconstruction bank that channels public and private capital into energy and power infrastructure, critical minerals, transport and logistics, and technology sectors areas. Firms such as BlackRock, JP Morgan, and McKinsey were initially engaged to help structure investment vehicles that could attract global capital, and although the pursuit of a standalone BlackRock-led fund has been paused, BlackRock rekindled its interest to participate in high-level working groups shaping the reconstruction roadmap. Meanwhile, US agencies like the Development Finance Corporation are actively de-risking projects to entice private capital, signaling a shift from purely aid-driven assistance to market-oriented reconstruction partnerships that bind Ukraine more tightly into the transatlantic economic and security architecture.

    The 2025 U.S.–EU trade framework agreement negotiated by President Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen represents a significant evolution in transatlantic economic relations. At its core, the deal establishes a new baseline tariff regime, with the United States imposing a 15% tariff cap (up from 0% during previous administrations, though half of what was initially threatened) on most EU goods and the EU committing to eliminate tariffs on American industrial products, offering greater market access to US exports. Beyond tariffs, the framework includes expansive commitments on European investment in the United States, projected at roughly $600 billion, and strategic energy purchases of US resources, signaling a deeper commercial interdependence tied to energy security. Both sides also pledged to tackle non-tariff barriers through enhanced regulatory cooperation and mutual standards recognition. While the agreement has eased an imminent trade confrontation, it has already sparked debate within EU political circles over balance and reciprocity, with many saying that the EU capitulated in an attempt to avoid harsher American measures; much in the deal was intent rather than enforceable commitments, so there is much uncertainty at this moment in how economically it will play out. However, the consensus was that it restored, at the very least, a sense of "stability and predictability" for transatlantic business in the wake of threatened tariffs during the first couple of months of Trump's second term.

    Right after, Trump and UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer held a conference at his newly-built Turnberry golf course in Scotland. This marked a positive reinforcement to joint-cooperation efforts between the US and UK regarding Gaza and Ukraine. King Charles III invited President Trump back to the UK a few months later for an official state visit (this was the first time in modern history when a US president had two official state visits to the UK). During this second meeting, he and Starmer signed a new “Tech Prosperity Deal” and announced expanded US investment in the UK focused on artificial intelligence, nuclear power, and advanced technologies, and reaffirmed cooperation on global crises going forward. Will this last?

    In November, the State Department released its 2025 National Security Strategy, in which it identified three threats to the Western hemisphere: "migration, drugs and crime, and China" (Brookings). While it touched on more than just Europe, there was a lot of criticism towards the continent, in particular the EU's current policies regarding immigration and free speech. After publishing the NSS, the State Department released, both on social media and in conferences by senior officials, including Secretary Marco Rubio and others, reiterated this disapproval. Its official X account posted that it ordered US embassies to report on "human rights implications and public safety impacts of mass migration". In tandem, it urged officials to "report policies that punish citizens who object to continued mass migration and document crimes and human rights abuses committed by people of a migration background." They cited the typical talking points, such as the rising rates of sexual assault in Germany, Sweden, and the UK, though also, more interesting and pertinent to EurDC, the decline of a European identity, which the US deemed as a threat to the very fabric of NATO, citing those who made the original agreements shared values that are being eroded through demographic shifts.

    As I'm writing this article, it comes about a week after President Trump re-announced his plans to acquire Greenland. This event was the straw that broke the camel's back that forced me to write this article. It's true that he's consistent in wanting it for national security purposes, but it remains contested that a) Denmark won't use Greenland to defend the Western hemisphere against attacks b) or that the territory is indeed needed for US national security purposes. Seemingly, President Trump doesn't see a future for NATO as an organization and wants to consolidate power under solely the US, or have much confidence in Western Europe reversing its demographic shifts and wants to get ahead of it. The Greenlanders expressed their discontent in being the center of attention again. The leader of Greenland said that they chose Denmark over the US, but it remains to be seen whether their opinion will be listened to, though unlikely. The European response to this has been vehemently opposed. In an effort to deter acquisition of Greenland by the US, politicians in the UK are tossing around the idea of using the Joint Expeditionary Force with NATO backing to show that High North is taking the security risks brought up by the US seriously, and can handle any threats themselves.

    The renewed American interest in acquiring Greenland collapses the boundary between ally and asset. Since the end of WWII, the understanding of a right to sovereignty, a key tenant of which is control over one's own territory, shattered when Russia launched the highly publicized full-scale invasion of Ukraine, after winning a modest victory in Georgia in 2008. This was nearly universally condemned as an unjustified use of force, and rightly so. There were others, but for being a Eurocentric organization and for brevity's sake, they will be omitted. European–American relations rested on an assumption of mutual respect for territorial integrity, especially within the alliance. By publicly treating Greenland as something to be negotiated over rather than a people with agency, Washington is no longer behaving as a partner within Europe’s political family but as an external power assessing strategic inventory. Once an ally begins to speak about acquiring European territory, the premise of shared civilizational footing is no longer secure. Through this lens, the backlash is justified. How can the US say it has a moral superiority when dealing with China or Russia, the former wanting to take Taiwan and the latter at war with Ukraine trying to take its territory?

    European leaders now operate under pressure from three directions at once. They face Russia’s ongoing military threat and information warfare, forcing constant emphasis on security and deterrence. At the same time, they confront demographic decline, i.e. aging populations, low birthrates, and immigration systems that no longer have broad legitimacy, all straining their welfare systems and with it eroding social continuity that cannot be solved by rhetoric or spending alone. Now, a third force shapes how these problems are discussed: America. US officials, media ecosystems, and political figures now supply much of the vocabulary through which Europe’s migration, speech, and cohesion crises are interpreted. The result is a continent that defends itself against Moscow while explaining itself to Washington and managing unrest at home.


















    

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